University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics
Volume 5

Issue 1

Article 5

2001

The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Health Care in China
Emily Yee
Princeton University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje
Part of the Health Economics Commons, and the International Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Yee, Emily (2001) "The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Health Care in China,"
University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje/vol5/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Economics Departments at Illinois
Wesleyan University and Illinois State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in University
Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics by the editors of the journal. For more information,
please contact sdaviska@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Health Care in China

Emily Yee
Princeton University

http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

Introduction
Fiscal decentralization, the devolution of fiscal power and authority from the
central to local governments, has been a fundamental aspect of China’s transition to a
market economy, and it is quickly becoming one of the most researched areas in Chinese
economics. While most economists agree that fiscal decentralization has been beneficial
to China’s economic growth as a transition economy, there has been growing concern
about the possible detrimental effects of decentralization on other aspects of the Chinese
economy (i.e. regional economic disparities, macroeconomic stability, and health care).
Despite numerous publications on fiscal decentralization and several publications
on health care in China, the existing literature fails to sufficiently address the effects of
decentralization on health care. For example, a study by the World Bank (1997)
discussed the “profound repercussions” of fiscal decentralization on Chinese health care,
yet it offered little empirical evidence to support this claim. In my independent work, I
empirically examine the effects of fiscal decentralization on health care in China by
estimating a model that regresses health care variables against decentralization variables.
From my analysis, I conclude that decentralization has not been detrimental to
health care when health care performance is measured by the number of doctors per
10,000 people, mortality rates, and local health care expenditure. However, the effects of
decentralization on health care are inconclusive when health care performance is
measured by the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first section discusses theories of
federalism. The second section presents an overview of China’s economic reforms since
1980. The third section discusses the current state of health care in China and its
1
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supposed relationship to fiscal decentralization. The fourth section discusses the data, the
variables, and the model I use to measure the effects of decentralization on health care.
The fifth section discusses the results of my empirical analysis.
I. First and Second Generation Theories of Federalism
Within the realm of federalism, two schools of thought explaining the economic
benefits of decentralization have emerged. First-generation theories, discussed in several
works spanning the mid-1940s to the early 1970s, emphasize two main benefits of
decentralization. The first benefit, discussed by Hayek (1945), asserts that local
governments are able to make better decisions than the national government about local
conditions and preferences because they have better access to local information. The
second benefit, discussed by Tiebout (1956), maintains that competition among local
governments “...allows citizens to sort themselves and match their preferences with a
particular menu of local public goods.”1 Building on these preceding works, Musgrave
(1959) and Oates (1972) propose that the appropriate assignment of expenditures and
taxes to the various levels of government could increase welfare on both the local and
national levels.2
Second-generation theories focus on government incentives and state-market
relationships (Qian and Roland, 1998 and Qian and Weingast, 1997). Specifically, these
theories contend that governments have hidden agendas and are not benevolent, as the
first-generation theories assume. Thus, second-generation theories find that a strong
relationship between local expenditures and local revenue can align the interests of local
1
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governments to local economic prosperity.3 Furthermore, second-generation theories
expand beyond the scope of first-generation theories by examining the effects of
federalism on government behavior.
One of the key differences between first- and second-generation theories is their
diametric perspectives on revenue transfers between the central and local governments.
Although first-generation theories emphasize the benefits of fiscal decentralization, they
also recognize a number of circumstances where decentralization leads to allocative
distortions and a weakening of the central government’s fiscal capability. Due to these
concerns, first-generation theories do not find complete regional “self-financing” (i.e., the
dependence of local governments on their own tax revenue collection for the financing of
their expenditures) desirable.4
In contrast, second-generation theories find that the benefits of regional “selffinancing” outweigh the disadvantages of allocative distortions and a weakening of the
central government’s fiscal capacity. Linking the revenue collections of local
governments with their expenditures and limiting the central government’s redistribution
among local governments will provide a greater incentive to local governments to pursue
market-oriented reforms. These market-oriented reforms will increase the economic
productivity of the locale, and the increase in local productivity will increase the revenue
base of local governments. Thus, placing fiscal responsibility into the hands of local
governments proves to be economically beneficial, especially in a transition economy.

2
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II. An Overview of Chinese Fiscal Decentralization
The Chinese fiscal administrative system consists of a central government and
four subnational levels of government, which are referred to as “local governments.” The
local governments consist of:
•

31 provincial-level localities: 22 provinces, four municipalities under the central
government, and five autonomous regions.

•

Prefecture level: 335 prefectures and municipalities.

•

County level: 2166 counties and cities.

•

Township level: Several tens of thousands of townships, towns, and city districts.
Prior to 1980, China’s fiscal system was heavily centralized. Profits and taxes

from local governments were sent to the central government and then transferred back to
provinces according to their expenditure needs. Local governments did not have an
active role in the economy.
Since 1980, China has undergone a series of reforms that have given local
governments more fiscal authority and incentives to develop local economies. Local
governments have more power in revenue collection, government expenditure, credit
allocation, investment project proposal, price and wage control, foreign trade
management, and industrial policy formation.5 Since reforms began in 1980, the
intergovernmental relationship has gone through three main phases. These phases are
discussed below.
In 1980, the centralized system became a revenue sharing system. The system,
called the contract responsibility system, divided revenues into three types: central-fixed

4
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revenues (revenues accrued to the center), local-fixed revenues (revenues accrued to the
localities), and shared revenues (revenues allocated between the center and localities
according to an agreed set of rules). From 1980-1984, approximately 80 percent of
shared revenues were sent to the central government, and 20 percent were retained by the
local governments.6 The local governments collected the majority of revenues. The
central government determined the bases and rates of all taxes.
Due to growing regional economic disparities, the central government revised the
contract responsibility system in 1985. The revised version of the revenue sharing system
set varying tax schedules that were based on the budget balances of local governments in
the previous years. The new system enabled financially weaker regions to retain more
revenues or more subsidies and allowed the central government to maintain control over
the richer regions (i.e., Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) that
contributed most to central revenue. Although the reformed system effectively dealt with
growing regional economic disparities, it reduced the richer regions’ incentive to expand
their tax bases. Thus, revenues collected by the richer regions grew more slowly than the
national average from 1985-1988.
In 1988, the central government adopted a new system that utilized six types of
central-provincial revenue-sharing methods. Each method applied to a specific number
of provinces. The 1988 fiscal contract system further increased the revenue share
retained by the localities, especially those that made significant contributions to the
central government’s revenue. This system lasted until late 1993.
5

Ma, Jun, Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Management in China (Great Britain: The Ipswich
Book Company Ltd, 1997) 1.
6
Ibid, 32.
5

http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

In 1994, the central government introduced a tax-assignment system. Instead of
allowing local governments to collect almost all the taxes, the central government set up
its own tax collection agency, the National Tax Service, to collect both the central-fixed
and shared taxes. Local tax services would collect local-fixed taxes. The reform
addressed fiscal decline and macroeconomic instability worries by giving the central
government control over a larger proportion of the total revenue.
III. Health Care in China
China has more than 200,000 health establishments and approximately 5.3 million
health professionals, including 1.9 million doctors (about 1.6 doctors per 1,000 people).
There are more than three million hospital beds, which is about 2.4 beds per 1,000
people.7 In comparison, the United States has 2.4 doctors per 1,000 people and about
3.85 beds per 1,000 people.8 China’s overall health status, as measured by life
expectancy, and infant, child, and maternal mortality rates is excellent compared with
other countries at similar income levels. Health in China has improved immensely in the
past 40 years. Since 1960, the life expectancy rate at birth has increased from 55 to 69
years.9 In the United States, the life expectancy at birth since 1960 has increased from
69.7 to 75.2 years.10
China’s gains in health care over the past four decades are declining according to
the World Bank (1997). The World Bank argues that decentralization has detrimentally
affected Chinese health care in rural areas. Prior to the economic reforms that began in
7
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1980, most rural areas had a cooperative medical system that reached most of the rural
Chinese population. Under this system, village authorities used funds from agricultural
workers to hire health practitioners who took care of the villagers’ basic health needs.11
Economic reforms since 1980 have eliminated agricultural collectives, consequently
weakening the financial base of the cooperative medical system. By 1985, fewer than 10
percent of China’s villages maintained cooperative arrangements. In 1993, about 7
percent of China’s rural population were insured, down from 48 percent in 1981.12
The World Bank also contends that fiscal decentralization hurt the viability of
health care in China’s poorest regions. In the pre-reform period, the pursuit of
communist egalitarianism required that residents in all regions enjoy as equal a living
standard as possible. To achieve equitable living standards across regions, the Chinese
government transferred a large share of income from richer and prospering regions to
subsidize residents in more backward and more slowly growing regions. 13 Owing to
government intervention in the form of regional income redistribution, residents in
backward regions enjoyed a relatively high standard of living compared with the output
level in those regions. Due to decentralization, the central government has been less able
to correct income inequalities between regions. Since local governments control most of
the spending on public health, the increase in regional income disparity has hampered
health care in the poorest regions. These areas, plagued with the worst public health
10
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problems, now have the least capacity to develop and maintain public health programs.
The health institutions in these areas must rely on user fees to generate revenues.
IV. Empirical Analysis
Previous Work Relevant to My Research
Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999) measured the effects of decentralization on
economic growth.14 Specifically, they estimated a model that regressed economic growth
variables (i.e. GDP growth, growth of non-agricultural employment, growth of non-state
industrial output, etc.) against variables that measured the degree of decentralization (i.e.
fiscal decentralization, state industry decentralization, and bureaucratic distance). They
found that decentralization had a positive and significant effect on provincial economic
growth.
The model I use to estimate the effects of decentralization on health care is a
slight modification of the model used by Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999). The model I
estimate uses the same decentralization variables that were used by Jin, et al. However,
the model regresses health care variables, not economic growth variables, against the
decentralization variables. The following paragraphs describe the data, the variables, and
the model I use.
Data
For my empirical work, I use a panel data set of 29 provinces from 1980 to
1993.15 Unless otherwise noted, the data for the decentralization variables was obtained
from Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999). The data for the health care variables was obtained
14

Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast: 16-18.
The data excludes Hainan and Guangdong since the data of Hainan was incorporated into Guangdong
before 1988 and became separately listed after it obtained provincial status in 1988.
15
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from China Regional Economy: A Profile of 17 Years of Reform and Opening-Up, which
was published by the State Statistical Bureau.
Variables for Decentralization
Fiscal decentralization, the first variable, is the ratio of local government spending
per capita to central government spending per capita. The higher the ratio, the greater the
degree of fiscal decentralization. This is the standard measurement for fiscal
decentralization commonly used in the literature.
Price subsidies were netted out from revenue and expenditure before 1986 but
were included as revenue and expenditure after 1986, so they are excluded from the
government expenditure data after 1986. Since there is no explicit provincial data on
price subsidy expenditures, the following method is used to estimate them. The central
and local share of price subsidies nationwide is used to calculate the total local
expenditures of the price subsidies for each year. Since price subsidies are only for urban
residents, and they are provided uniformly across provinces, the provincial share of urban
residency in the country is used to allocate price subsidies to each province.16
Although a ratio between local government spending per capita and central
government spending per capita is the standard measurement for fiscal decentralization, it
is somewhat difficult to interpret the fiscal decentralization coefficient in a regression.
Therefore, I transform the fiscal decentralization variable into a variable where local
government expenditure per capita is divided by total government expenditure per capita
(local government expenditure per capita plus central government expenditure per capita).

16

Ibid, 17.
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This second decentralization variable is called percent fiscal decentralization. The higher
the percentage, the greater the degree of fiscal decentralization.
The data supplied by Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999) was missing fiscal
decentralization values for the year 1993 in many provinces, and it was also missing a
large number of fiscal decentralization values for the Hainan province. I attempted to
reconstruct their data set to include these missing values and used data from China
Regional Economy: A Profile of 17 Years of Reform and Opening-Up. Although I was
unable to exactly replicate their data, the correlation between the reconstructed data set
and their data set is approximately 0.98. In addition to the fiscal decentralization and
percent fiscal decentralization variables that are based on the Jin, Qian, and Weingast
(1999) data, my analysis includes the variables reconstructed fiscal decentralization and
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization, which are based on the reconstructed data
set.
Accounting for the characteristics of top provincial officials, the fifth variable
used to measure decentralization is a transformed version of an index constructed by
Huang (1996) that measures the bureaucratic distance between top provincial officials
and the central government. The index is based on the career background of the
provincial Party Secretaries. The score is 4 if the Party Secretary was promoted from
within the same province; 3 if the Party Secretary was moved to the current post from
another province; 2 if the Party Secretary served in the central government before his
current appointment; and 1 if the Party Secretary concurrently holds a post in the central
government. From the index, the higher the score, the farther the top provincial officials
are from the central government. It is assumed that those provincial officials who have
10
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higher scores in the index are more likely to have better local information and better local
connections. They should also be more committed to local prosperity.
The sixth variable used to measure decentralization is state industry
decentralization, which reflects the relative importance of the local government versus the
central government in supervising the state owned enterprises within a province. This
variable is measured by the portion of industrial output from the state owned enterprises
supervised by local governments in the total industrial output from all state owned
enterprises in a province.
Variables for Health Care Performance
I use four variables to assess China’s health care sector. The first variable is the
number of doctors per 10,000 people in each province. I assume that an increase in
doctors per 10,000 people indicates an improvement in health care.
The second variable is the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people in each
province. I assume that an increase in hospital beds per 10,000 people indicates an
improvement in health care. However, duplication problems within the Chinese health
care system make the variable a questionable indicator of health care performance. It is
argued that an increase in hospital beds does not necessarily reflect actual gains in health
care. Yet, I believe including the variable in my analysis will be helpful in my assessment
of the health care sector.
The third variable is the provincial mortality rate. The mortality rate measures the
percentage of a province’s population that has died within a given year. I assume that a
decrease in the mortality rate indicates an improvement in health care. However, the use
of mortality rates in my analysis could lead to a specification problem because
11
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decentralization does not directly affect mortality rates. Rather, decentralization affects
the quality of medical inputs, and a change in the quality of medical inputs affects
mortality rates. I take this specification problem into account when analyzing my results.
The fourth variable is local health care expenditure. Due to data limitations, the
data I use for local health care expenditure is given in conjunction with local expenditure
on education, science, and culture. The values my model estimates for local health care
expenditure are interpreted with the above fact in mind. I assume that an increase in
local health care expenditure indicates an improvement in health care.
The Model
I estimate the model:
Yit = αi + βt + δXit + uit
In this equation, Yit, is a vector of variables that measures health care performance. The
αi represent the constant for each province. The βt denotes the annual dummies, which
are meant to capture the effects of nationwide macroeconomic fluctuation. Xit is a vector
of variables measuring the degree of decentralization. The uit’s are the disturbance terms.
In my analysis, I estimate the decentralization variables individually and jointly.
Random-Effects versus Fixed-Effects
Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999) estimated their model using a fixed-effects
approach. However, the use of a fixed-effects approach in the estimation of my model
may not be appropriate due to the use of different dependent variables. The fixed-effects
model indicates that there are significant provincial specific effects that, if not accounted
for, could bias the estimates of the model. A fixed-effects model accounts for provincial
specific effects, implying that any correlation between the health care variables and the
12
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decentralization variables cannot be attributed to inherent provincial characteristics.17 If
there are no significant provincial specific effects that could bias the estimates of the
model, then a random-effects model is appropriate.
I estimate my model with a random-effects model and a fixed-effects model. I
then conduct a Hausman specification test to judge whether a random-effects or a fixedeffects model would be more appropriate to estimate the model with. The estimates of
the decentralization variables are based on either a fixed-effects or random-effects model,
depending on which model is indicated as appropriate.
V. Results
Doctors per 10,000 People
The random-effects model is appropriate in both the individual and joint models
where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against the decentralization variables. The
random-effects model specification suggests that the number of doctors per 10,000 people
in a poor region is not significantly different from the number of doctors per 10,000
people in a richer region.
In the model where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against fiscal
decentralization, the coefficient for fiscal decentralization is 0.9967, and it is significant
at the five percent level with a t-statistic of 2.908. In the model where doctors per 10,000
people is regressed against reconstructed fiscal decentralization, the coefficient for fiscal
decentralization is not significant at the five percent level. By including 1993 data and
the data for the Hainan province, the significant positive effects of fiscal decentralization
on the number of doctors per 10,000 people apparently disappears.
17
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In the model where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against percent fiscal
decentralization, the coefficient for percent fiscal decentralization is negative, but it is not
significant at the five percent level. In the model where doctors per 10,000 people is
regressed against reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization, the coefficient for
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization is also negative, but it is not significant at the
five percent level.
In the model where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against bureaucratic
distance, the coefficient for bureaucratic distance is not significant at the five percent
level. The coefficient for state industry decentralization is also not significant at the five
percent level in the model where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against state
industry decentralization.
In the models where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against fiscal
decentralization (or reconstructed fiscal decentralization), state industry decentralization,
and bureaucratic distance, the decentralization variables are not significant at the five
percent level. In the model where doctors per 10,000 people is regressed against percent
fiscal decentralization (or reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization), state industry
decentralization, and bureaucratic distance, the decentralization variables are not
significant at the five percent level.
Disregarding the fiscal decentralization coefficient (which was estimated with
incomplete data), the results suggest that fiscal decentralization has not been detrimental
to health care as measured by the number of doctors per 10,000 people.

14
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Hospital Beds per 10,000 People
The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where hospital beds per
10,000 people is regressed against the fiscal decentralization variable. The coefficient for
fiscal decentralization is positive with a coefficient of 2.966, and it is statistically
significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of 7.231. In the model where hospital
beds per 10,000 people is regressed against the reconstructed fiscal decentralization
variable, the fixed-effects model is appropriate. The coefficient for the reconstructed
fiscal decentralization variable is 4.493, and it is significant at the five percent level with
a t-statistic of 5.500.
The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where hospital beds per
10,000 people is regressed against percent fiscal decentralization. The percent fiscal
decentralization coefficient is negative and significant at the five percent level with a tstatistic of -2.605. For every one point increase in percent fiscal decentralization, the
number of hospital beds per 10,000 people decreases by 11.139. In the model where
hospital beds per 10,000 people is regressed against reconstructed percent fiscal
decentralization, the reconstructed fiscal decentralization coefficient is also negative, but
it is not significant at the five percent level.
In the model where hospital beds per 10,000 people is regressed against
bureaucratic distance, the fixed-effects model is appropriate. The positive coefficient for
bureaucratic distance is not statistically significant at the five percent level. The randomeffects model is appropriate in the model where hospital beds per 10,000 people is
regressed against state industry decentralization. The coefficient for state industry
decentralization is not significant at the five percent level.
15
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The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where hospital beds per
10,000 people is regressed against fiscal decentralization (or reconstructed fiscal
decentralization), bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization. The
coefficient for fiscal decentralization is 2.378, and it is significant at the five percent level
with a t-statistic of 5.076. The coefficient for reconstructed fiscal decentralization is
3.951, and it is significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of 3.986. In both
models, the coefficients for bureaucratic distance and state industry decentralization are
not significant at the five percent level.
The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where hospital beds per
10,000 people is regressed against percent fiscal decentralization (or reconstructed
percent fiscal decentralization), bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization.
The coefficient for percent fiscal decentralization is negative and significant at the five
percent level with t-statistic of -2.270. For every one point increase in percent fiscal
decentralization, the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people decreases by 10.254. The
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization coefficient is not significant at the five
percent level. In both models, bureaucratic integration and state industry decentralization
are not significant at the five percent level.
The highly insignificant estimates of bureaucratic integration and state industry
decentralization suggest that these decentralization variables are not good variables to use
in estimating the effects of decentralization on the number of hospital beds per 10,000
people. This implies that the primary factor determining the number of hospital beds in a
region is economical and not political.

16
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The effects of fiscal decentralization on the number of hospital beds per 10,000
people are inconclusive. When measured as a ratio, fiscal decentralization is found to
have a positive and significant effect on the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people.
However, when measured as a percentage, fiscal decentralization is found to have a
negative effect on the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people. These results give little
insight into the effects of decentralization on health care when health care performance is
measured by this variable.
Mortality Rates
The random-effects model is appropriate in both the individual and joint models
where the mortality rate is regressed against the decentralization variables. In the model
where the mortality rate is regressed against fiscal decentralization, the coefficient for
fiscal decentralization is -0.2002, and it is significant at the five percent level with a tstatistic of -2.105. The reconstructed fiscal decentralization variable coefficient is -0.407,
and it is also significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of -2.381.
In the model where the mortality rate is regressed against percent fiscal
decentralization, the coefficient for percent fiscal decentralization is negative and
significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of –2.936. For every one point
increase in percent fiscal decentralization, the mortality rate decreases by 2.344
percentage points. In the model where the mortality rate is regressed against
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization, the coefficient for percent fiscal
decentralization is negative and significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of
-2.598. For every one point increase in percent fiscal decentralization, the mortality rate
decreases by 1.809 percentage points.
17
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In the model where the mortality rate is regressed against bureaucratic distance,
the coefficient for bureaucratic distance is not significant at the five percent level. In the
model where the mortality rate is regressed against state industry decentralization, the
coefficient for state industry decentralization is not significant at the five percent level.
In the model where the mortality rate is regressed against fiscal decentralization
(or reconstructed fiscal decentralization), bureaucratic distance, and state industry
decentralization, the coefficients for fiscal decentralization (or reconstructed fiscal
decentralization) are negative and significant. The coefficient for fiscal decentralization
is -0.2299 and has a t-statistic of -2.243. The coefficient for the reconstructed fiscal
decentralization is -0.6292 and has a t-statistic of -3.305. Bureaucratic distance and state
industry decentralization are not statistically significant.
In the models where the mortality rate is regressed against percent fiscal
decentralization (or reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization), bureaucratic distance,
and state industry decentralization, the coefficients for percent fiscal decentralization (or
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization) are negative and significant. The coefficient
for percent fiscal decentralization is -3.610 and has a t-statistic of -4.260. The coefficient
for reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization is -3.429 and has a t-statistic of -4.376.
Bureaucratic distance and state industry decentralization are not statistically significant.
The negative and significant relationship between fiscal decentralization,
measured as a ratio and as a percentage, and the mortality rate suggests that
decentralization has not been detrimental to the mortality rate. Health care has improved,
and this improvement has been realized in lower provincial mortality rates. Furthermore,
the specification of a random-effects model implies that the mortality rates in the

18
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provinces are not specific provincial characteristics – the mortality rates in poorer regions
are not inherently different from the mortality rates in the richer provinces. If health care
were worse in the poorer provinces, and this situation caused higher mortality rates, a
fixed-effects model would be needed to estimate the models because the mortality rates in
the poorer regions would be biased upward while the mortality rates in the richer regions
would be biased downward.
Local Health Care Expenditure
The data on local health care expenditure is taken from the category “Local
Expenditure on Science, Education, Culture, and Health Care.” China Regional
Economy: A Profile of 17 Years of Reform and Opening-Up did not specify how the
money was allocated among the four groups. Although it is possible that local health care
expenditures have decreased over time while expenditures in the other three groups have
increased substantially, the possibility of such a scenario is unlikely. In my analysis, I
assume that local health care expenditure has a constant percent share of the category’s
expenditure.
The random-effects model is appropriate in the model where local expenditure on
science, education, culture, and health care expenditure is regressed against fiscal
decentralization. The coefficient for fiscal decentralization is not significant at the five
percent level. The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where local
expenditure on science, education, culture, and health care is regressed against the
reconstructed fiscal decentralization variable. The coefficient is 11.685, and it is
significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of 6.409.
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The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where local expenditure on
science, education, culture, and health care expenditure is regressed against percent fiscal
decentralization (or reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization). The coefficient for
percent fiscal decentralization variable is 81.78, and it is significant at the five percent
level with a t-statistic of 13.607. The coefficient for reconstructed percent fiscal
decentralization is 71.416, and it is significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of
9.724.
The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where local expenditure on
science, education, culture and health care is regressed against bureaucratic distance. The
coefficient for bureaucratic distance is 0.644, and it is significant at the five percent level
with a t-statistic of 2.082.
The random-effects model is appropriate in the model where local expenditure on
science, education, culture, and health care is regressed against state industry
decentralization. The coefficient for state industry decentralization is not significant at
the five percent level.
The fixed-effects model is appropriate in the model where local expenditure on
science, education, culture, and health care is regressed against fiscal decentralization (or
reconstructed fiscal decentralization), state industry decentralization, and bureaucratic
distance. The coefficient for fiscal decentralization is 3.941 and it is significant at the
five percent level with a t-statistic of 4.485. The reconstructed fiscal decentralization
coefficient is 11.536, and it is significant at the five percent level with a t-statistic of
6.559. State industry decentralization and bureaucratic distance are not statistically
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significant. However, bureaucratic distance is positive and significant at the ten percent
level.
These results suggest that fiscal decentralization, measured as a ratio and as a
percentage, and bureaucratic distance have been beneficial to local expenditure on health
care. Political and economic factors have a significant role in determining local
expenditure on science, education, culture, and health care.
Although local health care expenditure is shown to have a positive and significant
correlation with decentralization, the increase in local health care expenditure may not
necessarily reflect an improvement in local health care. Local health care expenditures
could have increased marginally compared to the substantial decrease in central
government allocations for health care expenditures. Since the more destitute provinces
relied heavily on the central government as a source of funding, a decrease in central
government funds could have worsened their health care. Yet, the worsened state of
health care would fail to be reflected by the marginal increases in local health care
expenditure. However, such an unfortunate state of health care in the poorer provinces
seems unlikely given the results of the doctors per 10,000 people regressions and the
mortality rate regressions.
Conclusion
In my junior independent work, I attempt to determine whether or not fiscal
decentralization has been detrimental to health care in China by estimating a model in
which health care performance variables are regressed against decentralization variables.
I conclude that fiscal decentralization has been beneficial to health care when
health care performance is measured by mortality rates and local expenditure on health
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care. Fiscal decentralization, reconstructed fiscal decentralization, percent fiscal
decentralization, and reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization are shown to have a
negative and significant relationship with mortality rates. Fiscal decentralization,
reconstructed fiscal decentralization, percent fiscal decentralization, reconstructed percent
fiscal decentralization, and bureaucratic distance have a positive and significant effect on
local health care expenditure.
When health care performance is measured by doctors per 10,000 people, the
results suggest that decentralization has not detrimentally affected health care. The
coefficient for fiscal decentralization suggests that fiscal decentralization has been
beneficial to doctors per 10,000 people. However, the fiscal decentralization data was
missing several values from 1993 and the Hainan province, so the reconstructed fiscal
decentralization coefficient and the reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization
coefficients are probably more reliable coefficients. These coefficients imply that
decentralization has not significantly affected the number of doctors per 10,000 people.
The effects of decentralization on the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people
are inconclusive. The fiscal decentralization and reconstructed fiscal decentralization
coefficients indicate that fiscal decentralization, when measured as a ratio, has been
beneficial to hospital beds per 10,000 people. Yet, the percent fiscal decentralization and
the reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization coefficients suggest that fiscal
decentralization has been detrimental to the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people.
Bureaucratic distance and state industry decentralization are not very good
decentralization variables to use in measuring the effects of decentralization on health
care. The results of the analysis suggest that health care performance is more closely
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related to the financial, rather than the political, aspects of decentralization. The
relationship between local government expenditure and central government expenditure
is the primary force that affects health care performance, and the more political aspects of
decentralization, measured by bureaucratic distance and state industry decentralization,
are not as relevant.
Although my findings are not completely conclusive, they strongly suggest that
fiscal decentralization has not been detrimental to health care in China. Fiscal
decentralization has been beneficial to the health care sector in terms of decreasing the
mortality rates and increasing local government expenditure on health care, and it has not
been detrimental to the number of doctors per 10,000 people in a province. My research
hopefully adds a new and more empirical perspective to the existing literature concerning
fiscal decentralization and health care.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables
Decentralization
Fiscal Decentralization
Reconstructed Fiscal Decentralization
Percent Fiscal Decentralization
Reconstructed Percent Fiscal
Decentralization
Bureaucratic Distance
State Industry Decentralization

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Standard Deviation

1.475
0.797
0.549
0.412

0.397
0.263
0.284
0.208

4.785
2.549
0.827
0.718

0.932
0.479
0.132
0.125

1.777
0.751

1
0.095

4
0.997

0.849
0.126

Health Care
Doctors per 10,000 People
22.022
7.4
134.8
21.461
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People
25.190
13.3
59.3
9.091
Mortality Rate (%)
6.234
3.8
9.88
0.960
Local Health Care Expenditure
13.487
0.76
95.38
11.025
(100 million yuan)
The data spans 1980-1993. Unless otherwise noted, the data was obtained from China Regional
Economy: A Profile of 17 Years of Reform and Opening-Up
Fiscal Decentralization is the ratio of local government expenditure per capita to central
government expenditure per capita. The data for this variable was obtained from Jin, Qian, and
Weingast (1999).
Percent Fiscal Decentralization is a transformation of the fiscal decentralization variable. The
variable is local government expenditure per capita divided by the total government expenditure
per capita (local government expenditure per capita plus central government expenditure per
capita). The data for this variable was obtained from Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999).
The fiscal decentralization data obtained from Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999) was missing many
values from 1993 and from the Hainan province. I reconstructed their fiscal decentralization data
and included these missing values. Although the exact numbers differ, the correlation between
the two fiscal decentralization data sets is 0.98. The reconstructed variables are based on the
reconstructed data set, and they are calculated in the same way as the fiscal decentralization and
percent fiscal decentralization variables.
Bureaucratic Distance is an index that accounts for the characteristics of top provincial officials.
The score is 4 if the Party Secretary was promoted with the same province; 3 if the Party
Secretary was moved to the current post from another province; 2 if the Party Secretary served in
the central government before his current appointment; and 1 if the Party Secretary concurrently
holds a post in the central government. The data was obtained from Huang (1996).
State Industry Decentralization is measured by the portion of industrial output from the state
owned enterprises supervised by local government in the total industrial output from all state
owned enterprises in a province.
Local Health Care Expenditure is Local Expenditure on Science, Education, Culture, and Health
Care.
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Table 2. The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Health Care Performance
Fiscal Decentralization
0.997
(2.908)

Reconstructed Fiscal Decentralization
0.881
(1.260)

Hospital Beds per 10,000 People

2.966
(7.231)

4.493
(5.500)

Mortality Rates

-0.2002
(-2.105)

-0.4065
(-2.381)

Local Health Care Expenditure

0.6291
(0.947)

11.685
(6.409)

Doctors per 10,000 People

** t-statistics are in parentheses
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model. The Hausman
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data. The better-suited
model estimates appear in the columns.
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.
The Fiscal Decentralization column lists the fiscal decentralization coefficients when each health
care variable is regressed against the fiscal decentralization variable.
The Reconstructed Fiscal Decentralization column lists the reconstructed fiscal decentralization
coefficients when each health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed fiscal
decentralization variable.

25

http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

Table 3. The Effects of Percent Fiscal Decentralization on Health Care Performance
Percent Fiscal
Decentralization
-5.445
(-1.644)

Reconstructed Percent Fiscal
Decentralization
-3.997
(-1.336)

Hospital Beds per 10,000 People

-11.139
(-2.605)

-6.702
(-1.815)

Mortality Rates

-2.345
(-2.936)

-1.809
(-2.598)

Local Health Care Expenditure

81.781
(13.607)

71.416
(9.724)

Doctors per 10,000 People

** t-statistics in parentheses
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model. The Hausman
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data. The better-suited
model estimates appear in the columns.
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.
The Percent Fiscal Decentralization column lists the percent fiscal decentralization coefficients
when each health care variable is regressed against the percent fiscal decentralization variable.
The Reconstructed Percent Fiscal Decentralization column lists the reconstructed fiscal
decentralization coefficients when each health care variable is regressed against the
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization variable.
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Table 4. The Effects of Bureaucratic Distance or State Industry Decentralization on Health
Care Performance
Bureaucratic Distance State Industry Decentralization
Doctors per 10,000 People
0.0490
0.3643
(0.364)
(0.207)
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People

0.2731
(1.552)

0.0871
(0.043)

Mortality Rates

0.0427
(0.938)

0.3977
(0.819)

Local Health Care Expenditure

0.6438
(2.082)

-2.3800
(-0.526)

** t-statistics in parentheses
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model. The Hausman
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data. The better-suited
model estimates appear in the columns.
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.
The Bureaucratic Distance column lists the bureaucratic distance coefficients when each health
care variable is regressed against the bureaucratic distance variable.
The State Industry Decentralization column lists the state industry decentralization coefficients
when each health care variable is regressed against the state industry decentralization variable.
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Table 5. The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization, Bureaucratic Distance, and State Industry
Decentralization on Health Care Performance
Fiscal
Bureaucratic
State Industry
Decentralization
Distance
Decentralization
Doctors per 10,000 People
0.5545
-0.0615
0.4122
(1.390)
(-0.407)
(0.255)
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People

2.3780
(5.076)

0.0363
(0.203)

1.3290
(0.697)

Mortality Rates

-0.2299
(-2.243)

0.0579
(1.160)

0.4175
(0.842)

Local Health Care Expenditure

3.9409
(4.485)

0.5641
(1.697)

-0.9318
(-0.263)

** t-statistics in parentheses
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model. The Hausman
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data. The better-suited
model estimates appear in the columns.
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.
The Fiscal Decentralization column gives the coefficients for fiscal decentralization when each
health care variable is regressed against the fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and
state industry decentralization variables.
The Bureaucratic Distance column gives the coefficients for bureaucratic distance when each
health care variable is regressed against the fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and
state industry decentralization variables.
The State Industry Decentralization column gives the coefficients for state industry
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the fiscal decentralization,
bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.
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Table 6. The Effects of Reconstructed Fiscal Decentralization, Bureaucratic
Distance, and State Industry Decentralization on Health Care Performance
Reconstructed Fiscal
Decentralization
1.1833
(1.432)

Bureaucratic
Distance
-0.0696
(-0.460)

State Industry
Decentralization
0.2967
(0.182)

Hospital Beds per 10,000 People

3.9508
(3.986)

0.0061
(0.034)

0.5346
(0.272)

Mortality Rates

-0.6292
(-3.305)

0.0556
(1.118)

0.2479
(0.507)

Local Health Care Expenditure

11.5359
(6.559)

0.5048
(1.572)

-0.8023
(-0.231)

Doctors per 10,000 People

** t-statistics in parentheses
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model. The Hausman
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data. The better-suited
model estimates appear in the columns.
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.
The Reconstructed Fiscal Decentralization column gives the coefficients for reconstructed fiscal
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed fiscal
decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.
The Bureaucratic Distance column gives the coefficients for bureaucratic distance when each
health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic
distance, and state industry decentralization variables.
The State Industry Decentralization column gives the coefficients for state industry
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed fiscal
decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.
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Table 7. The Effects of Percent Fiscal Decentralization, Bureaucratic Distance, and State
Industry Decentralization on Health Care Performance
Percent Fiscal
Bureaucratic
State Industry
Decentralization
Distance
Decentralization
Doctors per 10,000 People
-2.8703
-0.0576
0.0099
(-0.783)
(-0.380)
(0.006)
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People

-10.2543
(-2.270)

0.0372
(0.200)

-0.1520
(-0.077)

Mortality Rates

-3.6097
(-4.260)

0.06299
(1.290)

0.3706
(0.764)

Local Health Care Expenditure

85.7838
(13.116)

0.4882
(1.813)

1.3933
(0.485)

** t-statistics in parentheses
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model. The Hausman
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data. The better-suited
model estimates appear in the columns.
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.
The Percent Fiscal Decentralization column gives the coefficients for percent fiscal
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the percent fiscal
decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.
The Bureaucratic Distance column gives the coefficients for bureaucratic distance when each
health care variable is regressed against the percent fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic distance,
and state industry decentralization variables.
The State Industry Decentralization column gives the coefficients for state industry
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the percent fiscal
decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.
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Table 8. The Effects of Reconstructed Percent Fiscal Decentralization, Bureaucratic
Distance, and State Industry Decentralization on Health Care Performance
Reconstructed Percent Bureaucratic
State Industry
Fiscal Decentralization
Distance
Decentralization
Doctors per 10,000 People
1.2924
-0.0668
0.1441
(0.342)
(-0.440)
(0.088)
Hospital Beds per 10,000 People

-1.8171
(-0.387)

0.0179
(0.096)

-0.0518
(-0.026)

Mortality Rates

-3.4294
(-4.376)

0.0585
(1.192)

0.2325
(0.483)

Local Health Care Expenditure

85.3697
(12.368)

0.04010
(1.451)

-0.2010
(-0.067)

** t-statistics in parentheses
Each regression was done with both a fixed-effects and random-effects model. The Hausman
specification test was used to determine which model better suited the data. The better-suited
model estimates appear in the columns.
Each regression includes a full set of provincial dummies and year dummies.
The Reconstructed Percent Fiscal Decentralization column gives the coefficients for
reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against
the percent fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization
variables.
The Bureaucratic Distance column gives the coefficients for bureaucratic distance when each
health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed percent fiscal decentralization,
bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.
The State Industry Decentralization column gives the coefficients for state industry
decentralization when each health care variable is regressed against the reconstructed percent
fiscal decentralization, bureaucratic distance, and state industry decentralization variables.
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